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STUDENT NOTES
THE DEPL

oN DEDucroN

As APLIED TO STms

MIING

Since its inception in 1913,1 the depletion deduction has been
the subject of much litigation, not all of which has helped to clarify
the application of the statutes.2 By far the greater part of the case
law on the subject concerns oil and gas, but perhaps that can be explained on the basis of the applicable depletion percentage, 27 %.3
However, the same basic principles apply in those cases as in mining
and such decisions have been cited interchangeably by the courts.4
The original purpose of the deduction was to return to the
taxpayer the capital that is exhausted by production of the natural
resource,5 but this view does not now prevail as to percentage del Tariff Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 114.

2 MEaRENs, FEDERL INco~m TAXATIoN § 24.21 (1954 ed.) (hereinafter
cited as MEREs).

3aNr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613(b)(1) (hereinafter cited as 1954
CoDE). For a discussion of the justification (or lack of same) for this rate,
see Baker and Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64 HAnv.
L. REv. 361 (1951).
4Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. 166 (N.D.W. Va. 1946);
G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 CufL. BULL. 42.
5 Austin, Percentage Depletions: Its Background and Legislative History,
21 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 31 (1952).
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pletion. 6 The present allowance bears little relation to capital in-

vestment and the taxpayer is not limited to recoupment of his original investment; the allowance continues so long as minerals are
7
extracted.
Computing the Deduction
The basic depletion section of the Codes provides that in computing taxable income, there shall be allowed as a deduction a reasonable allowance for depletion, according to the peculiar conditions
of each case. Such allowance is to be made under regulations prescribed by the secretary or his delegate. At the present time, two 9
methods are used- "cost depletion" and "percentage depletion."
These will be treated in that order.
Cost depletion depends on two factors: (1) the adjusted basis
of the property, which is the same as that used for determining gain
or loss upon sale or other disposition of the property;1 0 and (2) an
estimate of the number of recoverable units therein, 1" which must
be made according to the method current in the industry.12 To
compute the allowance, the basis is divided by the number of units
remaining as of the taxable year, and this figure is multiplied by the
number of units sold within the taxable year:' 8
Basis
X Units Sold =
Remaining Units

Depletion Deduction 14

If the estimate of recoverable units is too high or too low, the revised estimate is not applied retroactively, but is used to spread
the unrecovered portion of the basis over the remaining life of
the property.'"
6 4 MERTENS

§ 24.81.

7 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 850 U.S. 808, 812 (1956).
8 1954 CODE § 611.
9 A third method, eliminated from the 1954 CODE, is "discovery depletion" which has been completely superceded by the percentage method.
10 1954 CODE § 612, with cross reference to id. § 1011. However, the cost
or value of the land for purposes other than mineral production, and the
residual value of the property, must be excluded from the basis. U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118, § 89.23(m)-2 (d) (1958) (hereinafter cited as Reg. 118).
"11954 CODE § 612; Reg. 118, § 39.28(m)-2 (1958).
12 Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-9(a) (1958).
13 Id. § 89.28(m)-2(a) (1958).
14For technical discussions of the accounting procedures involved, see
Goulette, Depletion for Tax Purposes, 4 J. TAxA-oN 258 (May 1956);
Thurston, Depletion Deductions for Lessor and Lessee, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON

FED. TAx 1297 (1949).
15 Reg. 118, § 89.2(m)-9(b) (1958); 4 MEiTENs § 24.81.
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Percentage depletion allows the deduction of a specified percentage (10% for coal 16 ) of gross income from the property, but
any rents or royalties paid or incurred in respect to such property
are excluded from gross income. 17 "Gross income from the property" is that part of the sale price that is based on profit and the
expenses of extracting the mineral from the ground, the ordinary
treatment processes normally applied to obtain the commercially
marketable product, and the transportation of the mineral from
point of extraction to place of treatment, not in excess of 50 miles.' 8
It is often the case that the owner of a mineral deposit is unable
or unwilling to develop the property, so he leases it, retaining a
right to share in future production, and often getting an initial cash
payment known as a "bonus." 19 If the payment is in reality an
advance royalty,2 0 then it too is depletable. If cost depletion is used,
the deduction is computed by the following formula:
Bonus
Bonus + Expected Royalty

×Basis = Depletion Allowance

sl

Such allowance must be deducted from the basis, the remainder
of which is recoverable through depletion based on royalties thereafter received.22 If percentage depletion is used, the allowance for
coal is 10 percent of the bonus, but this amount cannot exceed 50
percent of the taxpayer's net income from the property, computed
without allowance for depletion.28
Who Is Entitled to Depletion
Although the mechanics of computing the deduction may prove
vexatious, the most troublesome problem in this field is to determine
who is entitled to the allowance and in what proportion. The great
bulk of litigation centers on this point.
161954 CODE-§ 613(b) (4).

17 Such allowance shall not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer's taxable
income from the property, computed without allowance for depletion. Id. §
613(a); Reg.118, § 39.23(m)-1(e) (5) (1953).

18 1954 CoDE § 613(c). However, ifnecessary, transportation over 50
miles may be allowed by the Secretary or his delegate. Ibid.
19
Baker, The Nature of Depletable Income, 7 TAx L. REv. 267 (1952).
20
For a discussion of the tests for determining this question, see C.C.M.
22780, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
21
Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-10(a) (1953).
22 Ibid.
23
Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-10(d) (1953).
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If the taxpayer has an "economic interest" in the mineral in
place, he is entitled to depletion based on his proportionate share
of ownership. The economic interest test was formulated in Palmer
v. Bender,2 4 which said that "the language of the statute is broad
enough to provide, at least, for every case in which the taxpayer
has acquired, by investment, any interest in (the mineral) in place,
and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from
the extraction of (the mineral), to which he must look for return of
his capital."2 5 Although the application of the rule has not always been
consistent, even in the Supreme Court,2 6 it is still the basis for allocating the deduction,2 7 whether the tax-payer seeks the deduction
or not, and without regard to the "formalities of the conveyancer's
art"2 8 or the "characterization of the transaction in the local law."29
An economic interest has been found where (1) the Commissioner
claimed the transaction was a sale and the taxpayer maintained it
was a lease, and therefore taxpayer was entitled to the entire depletion deduction;30 (2) the Commissioner claimed that the transaction
was a lease and therefore the deduction should be apportioned, and
the taxpayer claimed the entire deduction; 8 ' (3) the commissioner
asserted that taxpayer was a lessor and thus received ordinary income minus depletion, and taxpayer claimed he had sold the property, for a capital gain;8 2 and (4) the Commissioner denied that
taxpayer had an economic interest and was therefore not entitled to
any deduction. 8 But the search for an interest cannot be carried
too far: ". . the phrase 'economic interest' is not to be taken
as embracing a mere economic advantage, derived from production,
24 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
2
5 Id. at 557. This test is embodied in Reg. 118, § 89.23(m)-1(b) (1953).
26 See 4 MERTENs § 24.21.
27
In the case of a lease, the deduction is equitably apportioned between
the lessor
and lessee. 1954 CODE § 611(b) (1).
28
2

Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404,411 (1940).

9Bankers

Pocahantas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 278 U.S. 308, 311 (1932).

But ct.
Massey v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1944).
30
Commissioner v. Fleming 82 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1936). In this case,
part of the transaction was held a sale and part a lease.
31 Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. 166 (N.D.W. Va. 1946).
3
2Hamme v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1953). This situation
would not arise if taxpayer came within the scope of 1954 CODE § 631(c)
(disposal of coal with a retained economic interest). For the application of
this section, see Reg. 118, § 39.117(k)-i (1953); 3 CCH 1956 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. § 3592; 2 MERTENS § 18.13; 4 id. § 24.23.
3
3 Weirton Ice and Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 531

(4th Cir. 1956).
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through a contractual relation to the owner, by one who has no
34
capital investment in the mineral deposit."
As in all tax law, the Supreme Court rulings form only the
general outlines of the law, and the lower courts must apply them
to the infinite variety of factual situations which arise. Because of
this truism, the decisions of the various circuits are sometimes, to
say the least, slightly at variance. 35 That the economic interest test
is not perfect 3 6 can easily be seen by the numerous cases interpreting
it. It would appear that the general rule to be drawn from the
decisions is that if the taxpayer must look to production for the
return of his capital, then he has an economic interest in the mineral. 37 Conversely, if an owner-lessor has security for payment other
than production, he has not retained the requisite interest.38 In the
case of strip mining, Internal Revenue policy is that ".... the allowance is warranted only where, under the agreement between the
parties, the stripping contractor obtains a capital interest in the
mineral in place and must look to severance and sale of the mineral
for capital consumed in that process." 39 This opinion further states
that if the contract between the parties is terminable at will, or
upon "nominal" notice (less than one year), the necessary interest
has not vested in the stripping contractor and therefore he is not
allowed any depletion deduction.
With this background in mind, it is interesting to see its appli40
cation in two recent cases, Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co.,
and WeirtonIce andCoal Supply Co. v. Commissioner.4 ' In the Mammoth case, taxpayer entered a contract with X, giving X the exclusive
right to mine coal for an indefinite period. All extracted coal had
34 Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 367 (1938). This holding is reflected in Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-l(b) (1953).
35 Compare Blankenship v. United States, 95 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1938),
with Night Hawk Leasing Co. v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
a Quaere as to the soundness of the rule, but it is firmly established.
4 MmRTEs § 24.24.
3
7See Burton Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946);
Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 25 U.S.L. W=s 3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956); Commissioner v. Gregory
Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828
(1954);
H. W. Findley, 10 CCH TAx CT. Mmv. 863 (1951).
38
Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940). Cf. Commissioner v.
Fleming, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
39 G.C.M.26290, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 42

40 229 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. Wrxx 3104
(U.S. Oct. 9, 1956).
41231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956).
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to be offered to taxpayer for an agreed price, but any or all could
be rejected. In such case, X could sell elsewhere. The Tax Court
held 42 that X was an independent contractor with no economic in-

terest in the coal, and that taxpayer was entitled to depletion on its
gross income from the property, without excluding the payments
to X.43

The Tax Court based its result on the terms of the contract
Taxpayer had the right to suspend operations indefinitely but could
not terminate without good cause. However, the amount paid to X
per unit was not dependent on the sale price received by taxpayer
or even on whether taxpayer sold the coal. If operations were suspended under the contract longer than a certain period, X could
only elect to terminate. Taxpayer therefore had complete control
of the amount of coal X could mine. This was reversed by the third
circuit,44 which held that taxpayers must exclude from gross income

the payments made to X, in computing the deduction. The court
reasoned that since the contract gave X the exclusive right to mine
the coal, and taxpayer could not give such right to another until
X elected to terminate the contract, X's interest was sufficiently significant to entitle it to percentage depletion. X had to look to the
coal it mined for a return of its investment and profit.
In the Weirton case, taxpayer originally owned the property in
fee. In 1940, taxpayer conveyed the fee to Y, and at the same time
contracted to strip mine it for Y. Under the terms of this agreement,
taxpayer agreed to mine, clean and deliver coal in such quantities
and sizes as Y would direct, at a certain price per ton, to build and
maintain roads and to furnish necessary equipment, machinery and
labor. Either party could terminate the contract on 90 days written
notice.45 The entire operation during the period in question was
conducted by tax-payer without advice or direction by Y and taxpayer was never told to cut production. Under these facts, the Tax
Court held 46 that taxpayer had only an economic advantage, was just
an employee of Y, because Y could direct the quantity of coal mined
and could terminate the contract at will.
42

Mammoth Coal Co., 22 T.C. 571 (1954).
Supra note 17.
44
Supra note 40.
45 IfG.C.M. 26290, supra note 39, is accepted as -a correct interpretation
48

of the4 6law, the circuit court's decision is clearly wrong on this point.
eirton Ice and Coal Supply Co., 24 T.C. 374 (1956). - "
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The fourth circuit reversed the Tax Court and allowed taxpayer
to take the depletion deduction. The court relied heavily on the
Mammoth case as being on all fours with the instant case, and to
strengthen the holding, stated that "no stronger proof that Weirton
had in effect the right to mine the coal could be found than in its
willingness to invest $500,000 in the enterprise. It is of no moment
that the owner of the mineral ... had the option to terminate the
arrangement at any time, for as the event proved, Weirton actually
47
mined the coal during all of the taxable years."
Have the transactions in these two cases met the classical "economic interest" test of Palmer v. Bender? It is submitted that they
have not. That test requires that for a taxpayer to be entitled to
the deduction, he must acquire his interest by investment. Have the
stripping contractors in either case invested capital in the mineral
deposit? It is again submitted that they have not. In neither case
is there any mention of a bonus or advance royalty being paid to
the owner for the right to mine the coal. The only "investment"
mentioned is for roads, equipment, buildings, etc.48 It would seem
that all of the capital invested by the strippers could be returned
to them by depreciation,49 and no depletion allowance is necessary.
Depreciation deductions on such assets are contemplated by the Regulations, in which are used such terms as "buildings, machinery,
Since the
apparatus, roads, railroads and other equipment."5 0
owner's capital is being diminished, it is logical to give the allowance
to such owner, even though percentage depletion is not directly
related to investment. In severing and selling the coal, the stripping
contractor has no "capital consumed in that process."5 l No depletion is allowed on equipment sold to a lessee,52 and a fortiori it
should not be allowed on equipment if it is being depreciated at
the same time.
47 231 F.2d at 535. Emphasis supplied.
48
In Mammoth, equipment and buildings were valued at almost a million
dollars; in Weirton, the figure was over one-half million.
49
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allovance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence) of property used in the trade or business or of property held
for the production of income. 1954 CoDE § 167(a); U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)
through (h) (1956).
50 Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-17(c) (1958).
51 G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 Cum. BuLL. 42, 44.

52
Choate v. Commisioner, 293 U.S. 1 (1934). But cf. dictum in Cullen
v. Commissioner, 118 F2d'651; 653 (5th Cir. 1941): "The cost of equipment
located upon the'. . - leases which were not sold may .be recovered by percentage depletion allowances."
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From the foregoing discussion, the question arises: is Palmer v.
Bender still the law? Perhaps an examination of the latest Supreme
Court depletion cases will be helpful. In the companion cases of
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., and United States v.
Huntington Beach Co.,5 3 the state had accepted bids for the right
to extract offshore oil, but drilling had to be from filled lands or on
a slant from upland drill sites. As a condition precedent to consideration of a bid, the bidder had to show present ability to furnish
the required sites. Southwest did not control any uplands adjacent
to the area of oil deposits, so it entered agreements with Huntington,
the owner of such property. Consideration for the use of the land
was the payment of a certain percentage of net profits to Huntington. Both parties claimed depletion on this amount. The Court
held that Huntington could take depletion on the payments, and
that Southwest must exclude this amount from its gross income in
computing depletion. Southwest unsuccessfully argued that there
could be no economic interest separate from the right to enter and
drill for oil on the land itself. This was answered by basing the
decision on the fact that the proximity of the oil and the effect of
the state law combined to enhance greatly the value of Huntington's
land, and contribution of the land to this operation instead of selling it was a sufficient investment to establish the landowner's economic interest.
In discussing the principles of depletion, the Court said that it
is allowed even though no money is actually invested in the deposit.5 4 It is submitted that this statement must be read in context with the fact that Huntington made an investment in the operation by allowing use of its land, and therefore there has been no
refutation of Palmerv. Bender, as the Court cited that case and used
the reasoning above to make the present situation fit the requirements.
Supose that A owns the surface of a tract and B owns or leases
the subsurface minerals, but has no right of ingress or egress over
A's land and cannot acquire any adjacent land. In order to get a
right of way from A, B agrees to pay him a percentage of gross
income from the coal sold. Would A have a depletable interest? The
court of claims apparently would answer in the affirmative.55 This
53 850 U.S. 808 (1956).
54 For the other statements in'this discussion, see note 7 supra.
55Huntington Beach Co. v. United States, 182 Ct. C1. 427, 433 (19.55):'
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situation might be distinguished because there is no comparable
state law here, but it would be a very close question.
Apparently, the third and fourth circuits, while ostensibly applying the economic interest test, have actually evolved a test of
"production" unconnected with investment. It matters not that the
contract is terminable for any reason 56 or that the owner has full
control of the amount of coal to be mined 57 or that the contractor
is not dependent on market price for the amount of his compensation.5 8 In these two circuits, an owner who does not actually produce the mineral may as well resign himself to the fact that no
depletion will be allowed on payments made to a stripper, regardless of the contractual arrangement between the parties. The Tax
Court has been consistent in basing its results on just these factors.,5 9
However, since the lower courts have not enforced the requirement
of investment, is that element no longer necessary? Perhaps not.
But in any event, until the Supreme Court accepts a strip mining
case for review, the borderline between "economic interest" and
"economic advantage" in this field will remain clouded.
C. M. C.
0
IRRtEGULArSEs IN THE SELECrION OF GRAND JumS

The procedure for selection of grand juries is specifically set
forth in various statutes. Any slight deviation from this procedure
is quickly pounced upon by the defense as a means to obtain reversal
of criminal convictions. Whether such irregularities require a reversal depends upon the language in the statute. If it is mandatory,
the irregularity is fatal; if directory, substantial compliance is suffl56 Supra note 47.
5
7 Supra notes 42, 46.
58 Weirton Ice and Coal Supply Co., supra note 41.
5
9 Economic interest was absent in Morrisdale Coal Mining Co., 19 T.C.
208 (1952) (inter alia, owner controlled amount mined); C. A. Hughes &
Co., 14 CCH TAx CT. MEm. 172 (1955) (contract terminable on 60 days'
notice); Hamill Coal Corp., 14 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 218 (1955) (payment to
contractor not dependent on market price). Economic interest was found in
James Ruston, 19 T.C. 284 (1952) (contract not terminable at will, and
it gave contractor exclusive right to mine all the coal); Lincoln D. Godshall,
18 T.C. 681 (1949) (contractor to be paid only from proceeds); H. W.
Findley, 10 CCH TAx CT. MEm.. 368 (1951) (contractor obligated to develop
mineral and was dependent on market price for compensation).
0 In order to facilitate the consideration of this subject, citations for
'materials used in the statutory discussion are embodied in the text rather than
in footnotes.
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